



Upjohn Institute Press 
 
 
The Distribution of College 
Graduate Debt, 1990-2008: 






W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
 
Kevin M. Hollenbeck 











Chapter 4 (pp. 53-116) in: 
Student Loans and the Dynamics of Debt 
Brad Hershbein, Kevin M. Hollenbeck, eds. 
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2015. 
DOI: 10.17848/9780880994873.ch4 
 
Copyright ©2015. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. All rights reserved. 
Student Loans and 




W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb   iii 1/28/2015   8:21:53 AM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hershbein, Brad.
 Student loans and the dynamics of debt / Brad Hershbein. Kevin M. Hollenbeck.
  pages cm
 Includes index.
 ISBN 978-0-88099-484-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-484-3 (pbk. : alk. 
paper) — ISBN 978-0-88099-485-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-485-1 
(hardcover : alk. paper)





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Hershbein & Hollenbeck.indb   iv 1/28/2015   8:21:53 AM
53
4





W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Within the past 21 months, there have been almost as many major 
news articles on the topic of student debt as there were in the preced-
ing 21 years.1 Headlines have trumpeted the stories of recent graduates 
with six-fi gure debt levels and aggregate loan balances exceeding $1 
trillion.2 A growing number of policy organizations and Web sites have 
begun to focus and compile information on student debt.3 And, perhaps 
in response, President Obama announced in August of 2013 a major 
initiative to address rising college costs.4 Despite this increased atten-
tion on debt writ large, surprisingly little is known about how student 
debt has changed for different types of students or what factors can 
explain it.
Yet, understanding the patterns and factors underlying debt increase 
is paramount, both for ensuring that students and their families have 
a realistic, well-informed picture of college fi nance, and for guiding 
policymakers toward debt-amelioration strategies for those who need 
them most. Considerable focus is spent on average debt levels because 
these are easy to update frequently, but this may be misguided. The dis-
tribution of debt is so diffuse, as we show, that changes in the mean are 
not informative for most students. For example, an increase in borrow-
ing among the top 10 percent of borrowers will increase the mean and 
total accumulated debt—numbers commonly reported—but leave debt 
levels for 90 percent of students unchanged. This may seem a conve-
nient hypothetical, but it actually closely resembles how debt evolved 
for college graduates between 2000 and 2008. In short, factors that 
up15bhslatch4.indd   53 2/17/2015   9:24:20 AM
54   Hershbein and Hollenbeck
infl uence debt for the median borrower may be quite different from 
those that infl uence debt for borrowers in the highest decile. The effec-
tiveness of policy proposals meant to address “rising student debt” rests 
on how they recognize these phenomena.
In this chapter, we use the National Postsecondary Student Aid 
Study (NPSAS) to investigate the growing student debt of college grad-
uates—those earning a bachelor’s degree. Our focus on this segment 
of students is not because other groups (graduate students, students 
with subbaccalaureate degrees, students leaving without any creden-
tial) have not experienced rising debt—they have—or because they are 
unimportant. Rather, the choice is motivated by the recent media inter-
est in college graduates and the desire to limit the analysis to a manage-
able scale.5 The data cover the period between 1990 and 2008, and our 
analysis examines the entire distribution of borrowing among gradu-
ates. In addition to documenting how the distribution has changed over 
time, for all graduates and subgroups, we employ statistical decompo-
sitions to apportion the changes by various observable characteristics, 
such as demographics, attendance patterns, incomes, and costs. Nota-
bly, the decompositions allow the role of observable factors to vary at 
different points of the distribution. 
In broad terms, our major fi ndings are that debt profi les increased 
much more in the 1990s than in the 2000s, with the largest part of this 
increase occurring in the latter part of the decade. The growth occurred 
throughout the distribution. Between 2000 and 2008, debt increases 
were concentrated almost entirely in the top quartile of the distribution 
and at private institutions, and they stemmed largely from the expan-
sion of private borrowing. About one-third of the overall increase in 
debt at graduation between 1990 and 2008 is explained by observable 
characteristics of the students and the schools they attend. Interestingly, 
we fi nd that observables explain more of the increase at the extensive 
margin (whether a student ever borrowed) and around the median than 
they do near the top of the distribution. Of the explained share, roughly 
half can be attributed to college costs alone, although this still implies 
that costs account for a small fraction of the total increase in borrowing.
When we look at intermediate time intervals, observables explain 
most of the increase in borrowing—between 50 and 100 percent, or 
more—from 1990 to 1996 and 2000 to 2008. While cost structure plays 
an important role, so do other factors, and again there is a greater role 
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for unexplained factors in the upper tail of the distribution. In contrast, 
observables explain practically none of the debt increase between 1996 
and 2000, and this is true throughout the entire distribution.
We investigate several possibilities that might show up as “unex-
plained” factors in driving debt increases in the upper tail and through-
out the distribution in the late 1990s, including movement from informal 
to formal loans, redistribution of debt from parents to students, varia-
tion in interest rates, increases in federal borrowing limits, the intro-
duction of unsubsidized loans (which are not means tested), and the 
growing market for private loans. While the fi rst four of these appear 
to be unimportant, we fi nd suggestive evidence that the latter two may 
play a prominent role.
We note a number of caveats to our analyses. First, we are not able 
at this time to examine the distributional changes, if any, that occurred 
as a result of the Great Recession starting in December 2007.6 As docu-
mented by the College Board (2012a), aggregate borrowing increased 
signifi cantly during and after this recession. A second caveat is that the 
NPSAS data contain information only on current and graduating stu-
dents. As such, they do not contain data on postgraduation labor market 
experiences or repayment information, and our chapter cannot consider 
these important outcomes. Third, while the data are quite rich in detail, 
they do not contain information on previous institutions attended (and 
the net costs thereof), so differences across students (and over time) in 
transfer behavior are not captured in the analysis. Finally, the data do 
not fully document alternative loan sources, including informal loans 
from friends and family or borrowing against existing assets. Nonethe-
less, our chapter is the fi rst to investigate distributional changes in bor-
rowing over time and link these to changing characteristics of student 
attendance.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
data source and presents descriptive statistics and distributions from 
it. We then review the decomposition methods that are used to explain 
the reasons behind borrowing trends. The results of those decomposi-
tions are then presented, followed by a discussion of possible factors 
that could account for the unexplained portion of the decompositions. 
Finally, we offer concluding remarks. Two appendices to the chapter 
describe the data processing in detail and provide an overview of the 
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market for student borrowing, including the structure of terms and bor-
rowing limits, from approximately 1980 through today.
THE NPSAS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The NPSAS is an approximately quadrennial survey of students 
attending Title IV institutions (those eligible for federal aid) that is con-
ducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. The nationally 
representative cross-sectional survey is designed specifi cally to gather 
information on how different students pay for higher education.7 It pro-
vides student-level information on fi nancial aid provided by the federal 
government, the states, postsecondary institutions, employers, and pri-
vate agencies, along with student demographics and enrollment char-
acteristics. The restricted-use version we employ has incredibly rich 
detail, including administrative data on student fi nancial aid programs 
merged from both the Free Application for Federal Student Aid and the 
National Student Loan Data System, the central database for all fed-
eral loans. Extensive data about family circumstances, demographics, 
education and work experiences, and student expectations are collected 
from students through an interview.
The survey waves are reasonably consistent over time, which is 
important for our analyses of the debt burdens of graduating seniors 
from fi ve waves: 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 (the most recent 
available).8 The richness of the data is important because our goals 
are to understand why student debt is growing and for whom. Having 
cross-sections with large sample sizes and spanning almost two decades 
allows us to examine the growth in student debt over the entire distribu-
tion of college graduates. This allows far more nuanced analyses than 
are possible by examining means or population totals. (More informa-
tion about the NPSAS and how we process the data for analysis can be 
found in Appendix 4A.)
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DESCRIPTIVE MEASURES
Table 4.1 summarizes changes in the distribution of student bor-
rowing at graduation. There were substantial increases over the last two 
decades in both the rate of borrowing for bachelor’s degree earners and 
in the real levels of borrowing. Between 1990 and 2008, the fraction 
of graduates who borrowed increased by 13 percentage points, from 
about 55 percent to over 68 percent, with the sharpest increase occur-
ring between 1996 and 2000.
The next panel of the table lists quantiles of borrowing for all gradu-
ates, including those who did not borrow at all, in constant dollars. Mean 
levels have more than doubled over the 18-year horizon, with more 
than $5,000 of the total $10,000 increase coming between the classes of 
1996 and 2000. Since 2000, however, average debt has increased more 
modestly. This trend of rapid debt increase over the 1990s and milder 
increases over the 2000s is apparent through at least the 75th percentile. 
Only in the extreme right tail, above the 95th percentile, has borrowing 
continued to grow as quickly as it did in the 1990s.
The last panel shows that, among borrowers, the median level of 
borrowing more than doubled between 1990 and 2000, from about 
$10,400 to just under $22,000. However, that level remained stable 
between 2000 and 2008. On the other hand, the mean level of borrow-
ing increased between 2000 and 2008 as the individuals in the upper 
tail of the borrowing distribution signifi cantly increased their levels of 
borrowing. Even so, while there have been media suggestions of indi-
viduals graduating with six-fi gure levels of debt, these data suggest that 
such instances are quite rare, as the 99th percentile of borrowers did not 
reach that level of borrowing in any of the waves (see also Kantrowitz 
[2012]).
Table 4.1 thus illustrates two facts that are not well known in either 
the academic or popular press. First, debt at graduation increased much 
faster between 1990 and 2000 than it did during 2000 and 2008, and 
this was true throughout the distribution. Second, the increase in bor-
rowing in the later period was entirely concentrated in the top quartile; 
the bottom 75 percent of graduates of the class of 2008 had roughly the 
same debt as the classes of 2000 and 2004. These facts can perhaps be 
more directly seen in Figure 4.1, which displays the cumulative bor-
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rowing distributions of graduates from each wave of the NPSAS in con-
stant dollars. The remainder of this chapter seeks to gain understanding 
of the factors that shifted the borrowing distribution so dramatically 
between 1990 and 2000, and the factors that shifted the upper tail of the 
distribution between 2000 and 2008.
Our fi rst analysis is entirely descriptive and is meant to isolate 
changes in debt among certain subgroups. We examine four of these: 
1) dependent versus independent students; 2) public versus private, 
not-for-profi t institutions; 3) graduates who took four or fewer years 
to degree versus those who took fi ve or more years; and, 4) for depen-
dent students, those whose family income is above versus below the 
Table 4.1  Cumulative Borrowing Statistics from NPSAS, by Wave
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008
Ever borrow 0.545 0.526 0.636 0.656 0.682
Total borrowing ($000s)
Mean 7.2 9.2 14.4 14.8 17.2
25th 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Median 1.9 2.5 10.9 11.6 13.1
75th 11.4 17.7 24.5 23.8 26.6
90th 20.8 25.4 34.8 36.4 42.5
95th 27.3 30.8 42.5 47.7 52.1
99th 48.1 44.9 60.6 65.6 85.0
Total borrowing among 
borrowers ($000s)
Mean 13.2 17.6 22.6 22.6 25.2
10th 2.4 5.4 5.6 6.0 5.9
25th 4.8 9.7 12.9 11.9 12.4
Median 10.4 17.0 21.8 20.4 21.3
75th 18.0 23.6 29.3 29.8 33.1
90th 25.7 30.2 38.8 42.6 47.8
95th 32.1 35.1 49.0 51.6 56.0
99th 64.2 51.6 64.5 72.7 90.3
NOTE: Statistics use population weights (of late 2013 vintage) and are for domestic 
students in the year indicated. Monetary amounts are infl ated to year 2012 dollars 
using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) index from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes 
loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
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median.9 Figure 4.2 displays the cumulative borrowing distributions for 
dependent and independent students. As would be expected, the pro-
portion of dependent students with loans is smaller than the propor-
tion of independent students with loans, and the levels of borrowing are 
much smaller for dependent students in all years of the data. While the 
distributions for dependent students are qualitatively quite similar to 
the overall distributions (Figure 4.1), the distributions for independent 
students show a relatively smooth, monotonically increasing pattern 
over time. That is, each wave’s distribution (fi rst-order) stochastically 
dominates the preceding wave, which is not at all true for dependent 
students, whose debt profi le in 2004 is smaller than in 2000 for the 
middle segment of the distribution. Nonetheless, both graphs show sub-
stantially larger increases in debt over the 1990s than over the 2000s.
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and 
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends 
and family. 
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
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Figure 4.3 shows the comparison between public schools and pri-
vate, not-for-profi ts. It is not surprising that both the propensity to ever 
borrow and borrowing levels are greater in all time periods at the lat-
ter institutions. What is less well known is the remarkable similarity 
in the debt profi les at publics across the 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves. 
Aside from a slight increase between 2004 and 2008 in the upper tail, 
balanced by a modest decrease between 2000 and 2004 in the middle, 
the distributions almost lie on top of one another. Although much has 
been made of the decline in state-level appropriations to public univer-
sities during the Great Recession (Lewin 2013), these appropriations 
had actually fallen by about 15 percent per full-time equivalent student 
between 2000 and 2004, and they still remained below 2000 levels at 
the start of the recession (College Board 2012b, Figure 12B; Quinterno 
and Orozco 2012, Figure 6). Despite these reductions (and concomitant 
tuition increases), debt of graduating students changed little, especially 
relative to the large increases over the 1990s. On the other hand, while 
debt also increased little over the 2000s for the bottom 60 percent at 
privates, it increased substantially for the top 40 percent, with the size 
of increase rising with the distribution quantile. Above the 80th percen-
Figure 4.2  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Dependency 
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tile, the debt increase between 2000 and 2008 was comparable to that 
between 1990 and 2000.
Turning to Figure 4.4, we look at debt distributions by time to 
degree, although data limitations restrict the analysis to the 1996 and 
later waves. Students who take longer to fi nish accumulate more debt, 
almost mechanically, and as in the previous groups, debt increases 
faster between 1996 and 2000 than it does over the following eight 
years. However, for students who graduate on time, debt actually fell 
between 2000 and 2008 through the 80th percentile while rising, often 
considerably, above that quantile. Among the students who took longer, 
debt increased modestly but monotonically throughout the distribution.
Finally, we compare dependent bachelor’s degree recipients by 
family income in Figure 4.5. In general, borrowing levels are not that 
dissimilar across the income groups; although students from wealthier 
families have more resources, they also tend to graduate from more 
expensive schools. The standard pattern of fast debt increases during 
the 1990s is present here, but the most striking trend is that this increase 
is mostly concentrated between 1990 and 1996 for the lower-income 











































Figure 4.3  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Sector 
  Publics        Private, not-for-profi ts
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Figure 4.4  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Time to Degree











































Figure 4.5  Cumulative Borrowing Distribution among College Graduate 
Subgroups, Income of Dependents
       Lower half   Upper half
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for the upper-income group. A related point is that for the latter time 
period the borrowing rate increased only mildly for the poorer students; 
however, it increased by 25 percentage points, from 30 percent to 55 
percent, for wealthier students. Taken together, these trends imply that 
changing factors between 1996 and 2000 had a disproportionate impact 
on student borrowers whose family incomes were above the median 
and affected borrowing at all levels, not just the top.
A few themes from these comparisons stand out. First, the large 
increase in debt that occurred throughout the distribution between 
1990 and 2000 (Figure 4.1) is common to all the subgroups examined, 
suggesting that behavioral or policy differences, and not composition 
effects, are more likely to be the prime suspect. Second, “traditional” 
graduates (dependents who fi nish on time) experienced debt increases 
over the 2000s only in the top portion of the distribution, while “nontra-
ditional” students’ debt increases were more uniform.
The next section describes the decomposition methods we employ 
to systematically unpack changes in the empirical distributions.
DECOMPOSITION TECHNIQUES
To examine the factors behind increases in borrowing, we employ 
three different econometric decomposition techniques: 1) Oaxaca-
Blinder, 2) semiparametric reweighting, and 3) recentered infl uence 
functions. While the fi rst of these techniques is common in the litera-
ture, it is not suitable for decomposing statistics other than the mean. 
The second and third techniques, while not as well known, allow for the 
decomposition of the entire distribution of borrowing. Below we briefl y 
describe each of these techniques, including strengths and weaknesses.
Oaxaca-Blinder
This technique, independently published by Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973), linearly decomposes the average difference in outcomes 
across groups into differences in observable characteristics and differ-
ences in structural factors. Formally, let Yi=Xi βi+ εi  for i = A,B. Then
up15bhslatch4.indd   63 2/17/2015   9:24:35 AM




The left-hand term represents the average difference between groups A 
and B. The fi rst term in braces on the right shows the difference in aver-
age observables between the groups, multiplied by a common or refer-
ence coeffi cient vector, β. Since Xi is observable for both groups, this 
component is considered to be what is “explained” by observables. The 
second term in braces is the difference between the group-specifi c coef-
fi cient vector and the reference coeffi cient vector, scaled by the observ-
ables, for both groups. Since deviations from the reference coeffi cient 
are generally not known, this component is considered to be structural 
or “unexplained.”10 It is common in many economic applications (nota-
bly, wage discrimination) to set the reference coeffi cient β* to the esti-
mates of either βB or βA. In this case, one of the terms in the second pair 
of braces drops out, and the “unexplained” portion is the (scaled) devia-
tion of one group’s estimated coeffi cient vector from the other’s.11 In 
other cases, the reference coeffi cient is set to a weighted average of βA 
and βB, in which the weights depend on the application (see Jann [2008] 
for an overview).
In practice, Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition is straightfor-
ward to implement. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are per-
formed on groups A and B, separately, and Equation (4.1) is calculated 
using estimates of βA and βB from these regressions. The technique thus 
permits detailed decompositions that allow the contribution from each 
element of Xi (or β) to be estimated, as well as their sum. It is worth 
noting, however, that the εi terms cancel out as a result of the expecta-
tions operator (and the standard OLS assumptions). For this reason, 
O-B decomposition is valid only for the conditional mean function.
In this chapter, we use the O-B decomposition to investigate 
changes in the extensive margin of having ever borrowed at the time 
of college graduation as well as mean borrowing levels. Our choice of 
reference coeffi cients is the set from the earlier time period in the com-
parison, although we consider the sensitivity of our results to other sets 
of base coeffi cients.
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Semiparametric Reweighting
Proposed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) in their analysis 
of changes in the wage distribution, this technique reweights observa-
tions from one group so that the joint distributions of the Xi are simi-
lar for both groups. By dealing with the joint distributions of the Xi , 
this reweighting technique overcomes the linearity restriction of O-B 
and allows the construction of a counterfactual distribution, not just the 
counterfactual mean. Thus, quantiles and other distributional statistics 
such as variances or Gini coeffi cients can be compared.12
Semiparametric reweighting is implemented by performing a logit 
or probit regression on the pooled sample, with the dependent variable 
being equal to one if an observation is in group A and equal to zero 
if it is in group B.13 The right-hand-side variables include all the ele-
ments of X, and in some cases interaction terms as well. Fitted values, p̂, 
from this regression are used to construct propensity weights,  , for 
group B; weights for group A are set equal to one. If data are sample 
weighted, the propensity weights can be multiplied by the sampling 
weights to create composite weights. Distributional statistics for the 
two groups can be compared by using these composite weights for each 
group.
We employ this approach to compare the cumulative distributions 
of borrowing across time periods while controlling for the joint distribu-
tion of observables. However, a shortcoming of the reweighting is that 
it does not easily allow attribution to a specifi c (marginal) component of 
X. While it is possible to perform the reweighting multiple times, leav-
ing out one element of X each time, to isolate the contribution of that 
particular X element on the borrowing distribution, doing so is some-
what cumbersome and tedious for a nontrivially dimensioned vector of 
X. This drawback motivates the third decomposition technique.
Recentered Infl uence Functions 
This technique, suggested by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), is 
an extension of O-B for statistics beyond the mean, particularly uncon-
ditional quantiles. For any quantile q, defi ne the recentered infl uence 
function (RIF) as
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(4.2)    ×   
where Yq is the value of Y at quantile q, f(Yq) is the density of Y at q 
and needs to be estimated, and 1(Y ≤ Yq) is an indicator function that 
equals one if, for a given observation, Y is less than or equal to Yq and 
zero otherwise. Note that RIFq takes on only two values determined by 
whether Y exceeds Yq. The RIF has the interesting property that E[RIFq] 
= Yq.14 Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) show that performing O-B on 
the RIF can recover decompositions at the unconditional quantiles of Y.
While it is easy to estimate Yq in a sample, it is more challenging 
to estimate f(Yq). The density is commonly estimated using kernel den-
sity methods, and these are somewhat sensitive to bandwidth choices, 
particularly for distributions, like those for cumulative borrowing, that 
are not unimodal and roughly symmetric. On the other hand, the simi-
larity to O-B allows the marginal contribution of specifi c elements of 
X to be analyzed much more easily than in the case of semiparametric 
reweighting.
The Observables
The usefulness of each of the decomposition methods depends on 
the set of observed variables. Fortunately, the NPSAS data are espe-
cially rich. In addition to core demographics such as age, dependency 
status, sex, ethnicity, and marital status, the set of controls include par-
ents’ education, the student’s state of permanent residence, the region 
of the school, whether the student is in state, whether attendance is full 
or part time and full or part year, the type of institution attended, a set of 
majors, and whether the student changed schools during the last year.15 
In addition to these variables, all of which are binary or categorical, 
we include a quartic in expected family contribution (EFC) interacted 
with dependency status, a quartic in list tuition (or cost of attendance), 
a quartic in grants, and full interactions of the cost and grant measures.16 
We have chosen to include costs and grants with interactions separately, 
instead of a simple polynomial in net cost (e.g., tuition less grants) 
because the former approach is more fl exible and allows behavioral 
considerations (such as a response to nominal instead of net prices) 
while still nesting the more traditional assumption of net cost.17
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Despite this detail, the data are not quite ideal. The cross-sectional 
design of NPSAS limits what is observed about attendance history. 
While it would be useful to know the cost, fi nancial-aid structure, and 
attendance intensity for all years before graduation, we see only the 
fi nal year and must use these data as a proxy for the entire undergradu-
ate experience. Subject to this caveat, summary statistics of these vari-
ables, by wave, are presented in Appendix Tables 4C.1 (for continuous 
measures) and 4C.2 (for categorical measures). We will often refer back 
to these measures in our discussion of the decomposition results.
DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
Oaxaca-Blinder and Ever Borrowed
We fi rst seek to explain the sharp increase in the propensity of hav-
ing ever borrowed that occurred between 1996 and 2000. As this is 
a binary outcome, and we are interested in the mean change, we use 
Oaxaca-Blinder and focus across different time intervals that span the 
borrowing spike. In each of the time intervals, the reference coeffi cients 
are set equal to those from the earlier period. The composition effects 
thus capture changes in the joint means of the observables, assuming 
that the relationship between the observables and borrowing was the 
same in the later period as it was in the earlier period. This implies that 
decompositions with different starting periods are not strictly compa-
rable, but they may still be informative. For ease of presentation, we 
group the observable variables into seven more aggregate categories: 
1) age and dependency status; 2) sex, marital status, and ethnicity; 
3) both parents’ education level (including missing); 4) state of perma-
nent residence, region of school, and in-state status; 5) institutional sec-
tor, attendance intensity, and major; 6) EFC; and 7) tuition and grants 
and interactions.18 The fi rst panel of Table 4.2A looks at the 1990–2000 
time period, during which the borrowing rate increased by 9 percentage 
points. The decomposition shows that about 4 percentage points (45 
percent) of the increase was due to observable factors, with most of the 
effect concentrated in EFC (the mean of which fell in this time period) 
and tuition (which rose). The remaining share of the increase was due 
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Table 4.2A  Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Tuition
1990–2000 1990–2008 1996–2000 1996–2008
Mean difference (percentage points) 9.03 (1.40) 13.64 (1.42) 10.99 (2.02) 15.60 (2.05)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.27 (0.33) −0.81 (0.44) −0.09 (0.39) 1.12 (0.79)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.86 (0.49) 0.99 (0.55) 0.85 (0.52) 1.27 (0.65)
Parental education −0.42 (0.30) −0.43 (0.46) 0.98 (0.69) 1.31 (0.93)
Location, in-state status −1.01 (0.67) −1.75 (0.66) 0.41 (0.83) 0.49 (0.87)
School sector, attendance, major −0.01 (1.99) 0.68 (1.09) 1.75 (0.69) 0.86 (1.05)
Expected family contribution 1.09 (0.28) 0.64 (0.41) −1.08 (0.84) −2.44 (1.15)
Tuition and grants 3.40 (1.81) 6.75 (1.98) −0.73 (1.33) 2.30 (1.92)
Total 4.05 (1.51) 6.08 (2.38) 2.07 (2.16) 4.91 (2.96)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 3.07 (1.57) 5.77 (1.59) −0.08 (2.54) 0.33 (2.65)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −4.04 (4.58) −5.43 (4.31) 11.94 (5.59) 10.25 (5.10)
Parental education 1.51 (1.34) 0.36 (1.09) 1.13 (1.97) −0.37 (1.59)
Location, in-state status 1.72 (2.05) 1.55 (2.15) −1.77 (2.95) −2.76 (3.03)
School sector, attendance, major −1.94 (11.85) −2.01 (10.65) −5.92 (6.25) −4.28 (5.73)
Expected family contribution −6.33 (2.34) −1.65 (2.12) 9.90 (3.53) 15.49 (3.14)
Tuition and grants 0.90 (5.41) −2.20 (6.25) −4.20 (8.18) −6.99 (9.60)
Constant 10.08 (14.51) 11.16 (14.40) −2.07 (11.54) −0.99 (11.44)
Total 4.98 (1.57) 7.55 (2.24) 8.93 (2.02) 10.69 (2.68)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the 
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege 
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS 
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.2B  Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions of Ever Borrowed, Using Cost of Attendance 
   1990–2000 1990–2008 1996–2000 1996–2008
Mean difference (%-points) 9.03 (1.41) 13.64 (1.43) 10.99 (2.02) 15.60 (2.05)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.28 (0.32) −0.76 (0.43) −0.15 (0.39) 1.12 (0.78)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.91 (0.49) 1.11 (0.55) 0.87 (0.50) 1.29 (0.65)
Parental education −0.41 (0.30) −0.50 (0.46) 0.90 (0.67) 1.18 (0.91)
Location, in-state status −1.02 (0.68) −1.81 (0.66) 0.48 (0.86) 0.50 (0.90)
School sector, attendance, major −0.51 (0.72) 0.32 (0.82) 1.75 (0.67) 0.81 (1.05)
Expected family contribution 1.18 (0.30) 0.77 (0.43) −1.08 (0.86) −2.51 (1.16)
Attendance cost and grants 4.14 (0.94) 8.21 (1.34) 0.50 (1.53) 4.36 (1.86)
Total 4.57 (1.44) 7.34 (1.93) 3.27 (2.26) 6.75 (2.94)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 3.12 (1.57) 5.56 (1.60) −0.43 (2.57) −0.30 (2.67)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −4.94 (4.61) −6.80 (4.30) 12.78 (5.59) 10.69 (5.14)
Parental education 1.25 (1.33) 0.25 (1.08) 0.84 (1.98) −0.53 (1.61)
Location, in-state status 1.22 (2.05) 1.85 (2.21) −1.51 (3.00) −1.69 (3.09)
School sector, attendance, major −1.34 (3.91) −2.99 (3.69) −6.68 (6.15) −6.57 (5.76)
Expected family contribution −7.37 (2.33) −2.98 (2.12) 9.15 (3.50) 14.55 (3.12)
Attendance cost and grants −22.89 (9.03) −3.57 (10.88) −0.31 (13.41) 19.22 (15.59)
Constant 35.42 (10.88) 14.99 (11.93) −6.11 (15.16) −26.54 (16.99)
Total 4.47 (1.54) 6.30 (1.82) 7.73 (2.11) 8.88 (2.60)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the 
base period reference and are estimated via OLS (with sample weights). Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and intracollege 
correlation are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS 
Loans). Results change trivially if time to degree is included for the latter two panels.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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to changes in the coeffi cients relating the observables to the outcome, 
but the factor-specifi c estimates are too imprecise to isolate changes in 
marginal relationships. When examining the longer interval from 1990 
to 2008, again 45 percent of the increase is explained, with a slightly 
greater role for tuition.19
The next two panels use 1996 as the base year. While there are 
slightly larger increases in the percentage borrowing relative to the 
1990 base year, the share of the increases attributable to the covariates 
was smaller, between 20 and 30 percent. Furthermore, the explanatory 
share in this horizon did not load so heavily on costs but was more 
diffuse. On the other hand, the estimates on the coeffi cients for EFC 
are quite large and statistically signifi cant, suggesting that for a given 
ability to pay, students were becoming more likely to borrow. However, 
because the 1996 sample size is relatively small (see Appendix Table 
4C.5), these coeffi cient estimates are less reliable, and we treat them 
cautiously.
Table 4.2B shows that if we use the broader cost of attendance mea-
sure instead of tuition (but leave other variables the same), the picture 
is similar. A slightly larger share is accounted for by the observables—
between 50 and 55 percent for the 1990 base, and 30 and 40 percent 
for the 1996 base—suggesting that increases in nontuition expenses 
also increased borrowing. In summary, roughly half of the long-term 
increase in the borrowing rate was due to observable factors, with cost 
increases explaining the lion’s share. This leaves a substantial frac-
tion due to structural changes, and more so if 1996 is used as the base 
instead. Note that this pattern is consistent with the large increases in 
the debt profi le between 1996 and 2000. The behavioral explanation for 
this trend is a topic to which we will return.
Semiparametric Decompositions of the Distributions
What would the cumulative distribution of borrowing in 2008 look 
like if the distribution of covariates were the same as it was in 1990? 
Figure 4.6 answers this question by plotting the cumulative distribution 
functions (CDFs) from 1990 and 2008 (as in Figure 4.1) against just 
such a counterfactual distribution. Reweighting the 2008 distribution 
shows that just over half of the increased propensity to borrow (the 
change in density at zero) can be explained by changes in the covari-
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ates—very similar to the Oaxaca-Blinder fi ndings despite a quite differ-
ent methodology. Moving up the distribution, changes in observables 
explain approximately half of borrowing levels up to the median, but 
they become less and less relevant in the higher quantiles. This result 
is not entirely unexpected: changes in borrowing limits, both federal 
and private (see Appendix 4B), are not included in the set of covari-
ates, since they vary only over time and not in the cross-section, but we 
would anticipate that their effect would be concentrated heavily in the 
upper tail of the distribution.
The four panels of Figure 4.7 use the same reweighting approach 
across shorter time intervals. By looking at different time horizons, 
it is possible to locate when, and where in the distribution, structural 
NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used 
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates 
was the same as in 1990. (See text for the set of covariates used for reweighting.) All cal-
culations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and include student-
level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends and family. 
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Figure 4.6  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates, 1990, 2008, and Counterfactual 2008
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changes were more important in affecting borrowing than covariates. 
The top left panel reweights the covariate distribution in 1996 to resem-
ble the distribution in 1990. Interestingly, the counterfactual shows a 
much larger reduction in borrowing rates than actually took place, indi-
cating that structural or policy changes increased the fraction of gradu-
ates who borrowed.20 For levels, the counterfactual for 1996 generally 
gets more than halfway to the 1990 distribution between the 60th and 
90th percentiles, and it is basically identical to the 1990 distribution for 
the top decile. Observables clearly explain the bulk of the debt increase 
between 1990 and 1996, and we will subsequently analyze which 
observables were important to this change.
In contrast, the top right panel of Figure 4.7 illustrates a negli-
gible role for observables between 1996 and 2000. Virtually all the 
debt increase throughout the entire distribution is due to unexplained 
or structural factors. Consistent with the Oaxaca-Blinder analysis, the 
importance for behavioral changes is much greater in the late 1990s 
than earlier that decade.21 In fact, the bottom left panel, looking at 
changes between 1990 and 2000, is almost a composite of the previous 
two panels, with the counterfactual distribution approaching the half-
way point between the actual 1990 and 2000 distributions through the 
50th percentile, and roughly a quarter of the way from the 2000 to 1990 
distribution at higher quantiles. In some ways, this is reassuring, as it 
suggests that the earlier results are not just due to small sample issues 
in the 1996 wave. The last panel focuses on the change between 2000 
and 2008, when debt profi les increased relatively little. Here, reweight-
ing the covariates accounts for all the change up to the 80th percentile, 
about half of the change between the 80th and 90th percentiles, and 
almost none in the top decile.
From these decompositions, it appears that changes in observables 
were responsible for much of the observed shifts in borrowing between 
1990 and 1996 and again from 2000 to 2008. The exceptions are that 
observables overexplain the lower tail in the early 1990s and underex-
plain the upper tail in the 2000s. Moreover, observables seem to have 
no explanatory power during the late 1990s. What policy or behavioral 
explanations fi t with these patterns is a topic we return to in the next 
section. Before that, however, we turn to recentered infl uence function 
decompositions in order to gauge which set of observables mattered 
most.
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NOTE: The DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (DFL, 1996) reweighting procedure is used 
to create a counterfactual distribution for 2008, assuming the distribution of covariates 
was the same as in 1990. (See Figure 4.6 for the set of covariates used for reweight-
ing.) All calculations use sample weights, are in constant (year 2012) dollars, and 
include student-level borrowing from all sources except informal loans from friends 
and family. 



































Figure 4.7  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates, DFL Counterfactuals 
  1990, 1996, and Counterfactual 1996   1996, 2000, and Counterfactual 2000
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Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions
While the reweighting-based decompositions give a useful graphi-
cal overview, the RIF method allows for a greater level of detail of the 
importance of specifi c factors. Table 4.3A presents the decompositions 
over the 1990–2008 period for four statistics: the mean level of borrow-
ing (which uses the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition), and the 50th, 75th, 
and 90th percentiles of the distributions of debt. Of the mean difference 
in borrowing levels of $9,940, only $1,940—or about 20 percent—is 
explained, a result quite consistent with Figure 4.6. Although the larg-
est component is due to cost structure, the coeffi cient is imprecise.22 
Smaller, but more precise, effects are due to changes in EFC and atten-
dance patterns.23
At the median and 75th percentile, about one-third of the borrowing 
increase is explained, which is somewhat less than in Figure 4.6 for the 
median and somewhat more for the higher quantile, but not statistically 
different in either case. At both quantiles, the factors that were impor-
tant at the mean are still relevant, as well as a slight role for age due 
to graduates being more likely to fi nish in their mid- to late 20s. At the 
90th percentile, observables explain essentially nothing, as before, and 
this appears to be due to the coeffi cient on cost structure turning nega-
tive and canceling out the mostly positive effects from other factors. 
Table 4.3B repeats the analysis using the broader cost of attendance 
measure. The results are similar except for a slightly greater share 
explained by observables, and this is entirely due to a higher loading on 
cost structure (which is now statistically signifi cant). Nontuition costs 
such as room and board matter, particularly in the top decile, where the 
coeffi cient is now positive and nearly 30 percent of the increase in bor-
rowing is now explained.
Looking at the bigger picture, between 30 and 40 percent of the 
debt increase between 1990 and 2008 at both the median and 75th per-
centiles is explained by observables, and half of this share (15–20 per-
cent of the total increase) is due to changes in the cost structure alone 
(mostly tuition). At the top decile of borrowing, changes in the tuition 
and grant structure led to students borrowing less, but this reverses once 
nontuition expenses are accounted for.24 A small share, between 5 and 7 
percent, of the overall rise in borrowing is due to the increased fi nancial 
resources among dependent students and decreased fi nancial resources 
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Table 4.3A  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Tuition 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 9.94 (0.27) 11.17 (0.48) 15.19 (0.54) 21.66 (0.53)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.16 (0.08) 0.42 (0.14) 0.54 (0.17) 0.21 (0.18)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.11) 0.18 (0.14) 0.14 (0.23) −0.11 (0.25)
Parental education 0.02 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.27 (0.20) 0.14 (0.20)
Location, in-state status −0.14 (0.13) −0.37 (0.30) −0.18 (0.61) 0.00 (0.63)
School sector, attendance, major 0.63 (0.21) 0.96 (0.54) 0.96 (0.83) 1.65 (1.11)
Expected family contribution 0.26 (0.08) 0.67 (0.22) 1.08 (0.21) 1.28 (0.26)
Attendance cost and grants 1.23 (0.83) 1.32 (1.07) 2.67 (2.03) −4.06 (2.82)
Total 1.94 (0.86) 3.26 (1.48) 5.48 (2.32) −0.89 (2.75)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −0.23 (0.45) 0.85 (0.79) −1.38 (0.83) −2.86 (1.00)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.39 (1.00) −2.75 (1.40) −2.95 (2.11) −3.97 (2.09)
Parental education 0.06 (0.25) 0.18 (0.34) −0.68 (0.44) −0.29 (0.46)
Location, in-state status −0.40 (0.85) −0.63 (0.71) −0.13 (1.15) −0.32 (1.45)
School sector, attendance, major 0.75 (1.47) −2.55 (3.31) 0.98 (2.23) 1.45 (2.86)
Expected family contribution −0.27 (0.54) −1.42 (0.67) 0.99 (0.81) 2.89 (1.10)
Attendance cost and grants 4.57 (1.60) 8.51 (3.51) 2.74 (3.19) 9.40 (3.97)
Constant 4.89 (2.48) 5.72 (5.34) 10.15 (4.20) 16.26 (5.69)
Total 8.01 (0.91) 7.91 (1.76) 9.71 (2.35) 22.55 (2.78)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.3B  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2008, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 9.94 (0.27) 11.17 (0.48) 15.19 (0.54) 21.66 (0.53)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.14 (0.07) 0.41 (0.14) 0.46 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.15 (0.10) 0.18 (0.13) 0.14 (0.24) −0.16 (0.26)
Parental education 0.02 (0.10) 0.08 (0.11) 0.29 (0.20) 0.17 (0.21)
Location, in-state status −0.17 (0.13) −0.32 (0.29) −0.30 (0.60) −0.04 (0.62)
School sector, attendance, major 0.66 (0.19) 0.96 (0.52) 0.61 (0.79) 1.25 (1.06)
Expected family contribution 0.28 (0.08) 0.61 (0.21) 1.00 (0.21) 1.14 (0.26)
Attendance cost and grants 1.76 (0.35) 2.11 (0.98) 3.71 (1.40) 3.83 (1.93)
Total 2.55 (0.43) 4.03 (1.39) 5.91 (1.78) 6.32 (2.24)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −0.24 (0.45) 1.07 (0.71) −1.69 (0.80) −3.29 (0.97)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −2.28 (1.06) −3.26 (1.50) −4.39 (2.20) −5.71 (2.28)
Parental education 0.02 (0.25) 0.16 (0.33) −0.79 (0.44) −0.39 (0.47)
Location, in-state status −0.31 (0.88) −0.37 (0.68) 0.03 (1.13) −0.31 (1.44)
School sector, attendance, major −1.29 (1.08) −2.79 (1.09) −2.03 (2.08) −2.08 (2.65)
Expected family contribution −0.87 (0.54) −2.63 (0.67) −0.02 (0.83) 1.93 (1.19)
Attendance cost and grants 11.52 (2.60) 20.82 (5.33) 12.22 (4.65) 5.46 (5.43)
Constant 0.84 (3.15) −5.85 (4.51) 5.96 (5.33) 19.73 (7.22)
Total 7.39 (0.46) 7.15 (1.68) 9.28 (1.79) 15.34 (2.33)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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of independent students. This apparent paradox results from fewer 
dependent students qualifying for need-based grant aid and more inde-
pendent students not having suffi cient outside income to pay for col-
lege expenses. In all cases, a large share remains unexplained, with the 
largest change in coeffi cients loading on cost structure. That is, not only 
did costs rise, but for a given set of costs and grants, students borrowed 
more than they did in the past, conditional on the other observables.25
We now break down the decompositions by time period, looking 
at the 1990s and 2000–2008 periods separately. For the former, a quick 
glance reveals that, as in the reweighting-based decomposition, observ-
ables explain quite little (less than 15 percent) of the debt increase over 
the 1990s, and this is true throughout the distribution and whether the 
tuition (Table 4.4A) or cost of attendance measure (Table 4.4B) is used. 
The reduction in explanatory power relative to that of the longer period 
stems from the smaller load on cost changes, which is now negligible. 
This pattern is consistent with relatively small increases in both list 
tuition and cost of attendance in this time frame (Table 4C.1). While 
structural (coeffi cient) effects on costs are generally still present, the 
coeffi cients representing the constant term, which likely capture omit-
ted variables such as policy reforms, are quite large and statistically 
signifi cant, especially in upper quantiles.
Before turning to the 2000s, it is helpful to look at the 1990s more 
granularly, as the reweighting decompositions showed substantial dif-
ferences in the role of observables between the two. Appendix Tables 
4C.3A–4C.4B examine the 1990–1996 and 1996–2000 periods sepa-
rately. Reassuringly, the RIF estimates are quite consistent with the 
reweighting decompositions, down to overexplaining the increase in 
borrowing at the median in the early 1990s.26 For the earlier period, 
the change in age composition, cost structure, and EFC all contribute 
signifi cantly toward greater debt at the median and above, although 
the explanatory share falls from about one-half to about one-third 
when moving from the 75th to the 90th percentile, as the roles of cost 
structure and age diminish at the top of the distribution.27 In contrast, 
between 1996 and 2000, the role of age has diminished to negligible 
levels, and while attendance patterns contribute slightly toward greater 
borrowing, this covariate is outweighed by the reversal in the relation-
ships of EFC and costs. In short, observables explain more of the debt 
increase between 1990 and 1996 because the observables that tend to 
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Table 4.4A  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Tuition
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 7.13 (0.29) 9.03 (0.61) 13.12 (0.52) 13.96 (0.64)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.07) 0.63 (0.22) 0.81 (0.19) 0.33 (0.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.10) 0.09 (0.11) 0.05 (0.20) −0.15 (0.20)
Parental education −0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.02 (0.13) 0.14 (0.15)
Location, in-state status −0.07 (0.14) −0.88 (0.39) −0.50 (0.56) 0.07 (0.70)
School sector, attendance, major −0.02 (0.25) 1.05 (0.65) −0.01 (0.67) −0.25 (0.92)
Expected family contribution 0.15 (0.06) 0.49 (0.17) 0.47 (0.11) 0.42 (0.12)
Tuition and grants 0.85 (0.36) −0.12 (0.45) 0.15 (0.76) −1.36 (0.92)
Total 1.15 (0.34) 1.32 (0.61) 0.99 (0.89) −0.80 (0.98)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −0.51 (0.40) −0.62 (0.84) 0.12 (0.75) −6.72 (1.26)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.72 (0.98) −2.62 (1.88) −1.21 (2.18) −4.34 (2.56)
Parental education 0.17 (0.35) 1.37 (0.57) −0.52 (0.49) 0.11 (0.72)
Location, in-state status 0.23 (0.74) 1.28 (0.85) 0.38 (1.01) −1.66 (1.53)
School sector, attendance, major 1.37 (1.77) −5.63 (4.07) 1.80 (2.68) 1.54 (3.83)
Expected family contribution −1.82 (0.49) −6.99 (1.15) −0.09 (0.91) −0.12 (1.51)
Tuition and grants 2.78 (1.40) 7.15 (2.93) −0.70 (2.73) 8.73 (3.20)
Constant 5.47 (2.58) 13.42 (5.52) 12.27 (4.77) 17.22 (6.30)
Total 5.99 (0.46) 7.71 (0.99) 12.14 (1.02) 14.75 (1.25)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.4B  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–2000, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 7.13 (0.29) 9.03 (0.61) 13.12 (0.52) 13.96 (0.64)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.11 (0.06) 0.61 (0.21) 0.70 (0.19) 0.21 (0.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.14 (0.09) 0.08 (0.11) 0.04 (0.20) −0.18 (0.21)
Parental education −0.02 (0.07) 0.06 (0.08) 0.04 (0.13) 0.15 (0.16)
Location, in-state status −0.07 (0.14) −0.84 (0.37) −0.66 (0.54) −0.04 (0.68)
School sector, attendance, major 0.21 (0.16) 0.61 (0.42) 0.09 (0.71) 0.12 (0.95)
Expected family contribution 0.17 (0.06) 0.50 (0.17) 0.49 (0.11) 0.43 (0.12)
Attendance cost and grants 0.64 (0.24) 0.31 (0.61) 0.25 (0.70) 0.29 (0.69)
Total 1.17 (0.32) 1.32 (0.67) 0.94 (0.87) 0.96 (0.87)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −0.41 (0.41) −0.30 (0.79) −0.17 (0.77) −6.64 (1.24)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −2.26 (0.96) −2.51 (1.98) −2.33 (2.17) −5.63 (2.64)
Parental education 0.13 (0.35) 1.24 (0.57) −0.66 (0.49) −0.04 (0.74)
Location, in-state status 0.30 (0.78) 1.23 (0.85) 0.49 (1.01) −1.60 (1.51)
School sector, attendance, major −0.52 (1.31) −4.98 (1.75) −1.25 (2.65) −3.27 (3.99)
Expected family contribution −2.34 (0.51) −7.80 (1.17) −0.83 (0.92) −1.80 (1.58)
Attendance cost and grants 3.27 (1.94) 12.27 (5.94) 0.74 (3.73) 10.76 (5.08)
Constant 7.81 (2.54) 8.56 (5.52) 16.20 (5.36) 21.21 (6.88)
Total 5.96 (0.41) 7.71 (0.97) 12.18 (1.05) 12.99 (1.08)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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matter the most, cost and EFC, changed more in this period than they 
did between 1996 and 2000. The apparent puzzle is that the fastest debt 
growth occurred in a period when list cost barely budged and net cost 
actually fell.
The contribution of changes in observables over the 2000s, on the 
other hand, is considerable, and much of this is due to increases in cost. 
As shown in Tables 4.5A and 4.5B, the RIF approach substantially 
overexplains the shift in borrowing at the median and 75th percentiles, 
and more so when cost of attendance is used instead of tuition. Changes 
in cost often account for half or more of the observable share, although 
parental education, attendance patterns, and EFC also matter. At the 
90th percentile, where the reweighting decomposition found only a 
modest role for observables, the RIF technique places more weight on 
them, explaining at least two-thirds of the debt increase, with cost and 
EFC having the largest impact.28
In summary, the RIF decompositions qualitatively resemble the 
reweighting-based decompositions: a large role for observables in 
the early to mid-1990s and again between 2000 and 2008, but almost 
no explanatory power for them in the late 1990s. In both techniques, 
observables explain less at the very top of the borrowing distribution. 
The RIF analysis, however, shows that the most important observed 
factor contributing toward greater borrowing is cost, and this is particu-
larly true over the 2000s, when costs increased relatively quickly. EFC 
also matters consistently across time periods and quantiles. Smaller but 
still meaningful effects are found for age composition over the 1990s 
and attendance patterns and parental education over the 2000s, with 
all these more prominent in the middle of the debt distribution. Core 
demographics and geography, despite changing a great deal over time, 
do not seem to be related to the shift in student debt.
DISCUSSION
Although much of the increase in debt over the 2000s can be 
explained by changes in student and institutional characteristics, the 
NPSAS data point to structural, behavioral, or policy shifts underlying 
the majority of debt increases in the 1990s, particularly the late 1990s, 
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Table 4.5A  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Tuition
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.81 (0.25) 2.14 (0.50) 2.07 (0.38) 7.71 (0.61)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.47 (0.11) −0.34 (0.12) −0.25 (0.07) −0.57 (0.18)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.12 (0.05) 0.26 (0.09) 0.13 (0.05) 0.26 (0.12)
Parental education 0.49 (0.08) 1.16 (0.19) 0.40 (0.08) 0.52 (0.14)
Location, in-state status −0.05 (0.06) −0.04 (0.21) 0.02 (0.10) 0.42 (0.23)
School sector, attendance, major 0.22 (0.10) 0.50 (0.28) 0.45 (0.14) 0.92 (0.33)
Expected family contribution 0.22 (0.08) 1.33 (0.17) 0.66 (0.07) 1.30 (0.19)
Tuition and grants 1.09 (0.15) 2.44 (0.41) 1.11 (0.20) 2.15 (0.45)
Total 1.62 (0.24) 5.30 (0.65) 2.52 (0.27) 5.01 (0.61)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 0.47 (0.42) 1.61 (0.66) −1.51 (0.48) 4.31 (1.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.20 (0.94) −0.65 (1.48) −1.88 (1.05) 0.15 (2.39)
Parental education −0.57 (0.22) −2.32 (0.43) −0.31 (0.30) −0.92 (0.44)
Location, in-state status −0.65 (0.59) −1.36 (0.85) −0.21 (0.65) 0.85 (1.16)
School sector, attendance, major −0.19 (0.81) 2.50 (1.14) −0.30 (0.70) 0.88 (1.48)
Expected family contribution 1.45 (0.54) 4.42 (0.84) 1.02 (0.44) 2.57 (0.80)
Tuition and grants 1.07 (1.39) 0.35 (2.66) 4.86 (1.52) −4.19 (3.03)
Constant −0.58 (1.88) −7.70 (3.21) −2.12 (2.10) −0.96 (3.79)
Total 1.20 (0.30) −3.16 (0.75) −0.46 (0.45) 2.70 (0.90)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4.5B  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 2000–2008, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.81 (0.25) 2.14 (0.50) 2.07 (0.38) 7.71 (0.61)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status −0.43 (0.11) −0.30 (0.11) −0.23 (0.06) −0.55 (0.17)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.11 (0.04) 0.24 (0.09) 0.12 (0.05) 0.24 (0.12)
Parental education 0.46 (0.08) 1.11 (0.19) 0.38 (0.08) 0.48 (0.14)
Location, in-state status −0.06 (0.06) 0.02 (0.21) 0.08 (0.10) 0.59 (0.24)
School sector, attendance, major 0.14 (0.10) 0.37 (0.27) 0.33 (0.13) 0.60 (0.30)
Expected family contribution 0.23 (0.08) 1.40 (0.17) 0.70 (0.08) 1.42 (0.20)
Attendance cost and grants 2.08 (0.18) 4.29 (0.40) 2.34 (0.21) 4.61 (0.63)
Total 2.53 (0.24) 7.13 (0.62) 3.72 (0.28) 7.39 (0.85)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 0.35 (0.40) 1.47 (0.64) −1.52 (0.47) 3.82 (1.15)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −0.12 (0.92) −0.90 (1.48) −2.08 (1.03) −0.29 (2.37)
Parental education −0.53 (0.22) −2.18 (0.43) −0.25 (0.30) −0.81 (0.45)
Location, in-state status −0.64 (0.57) −1.09 (0.81) −0.17 (0.65) 0.71 (1.17)
School sector, attendance, major −0.46 (0.82) 2.18 (1.13) −0.60 (0.73) 1.72 (1.52)
Expected family contribution 1.35 (0.52) 3.88 (0.85) 0.62 (0.46) 3.02 (0.86)
Attendance cost and grants 7.29 (2.52) 6.06 (5.04) 12.58 (3.17) −6.37 (5.70)
Constant −6.97 (2.95) −14.41 (5.47) −10.23 (3.50) −1.48 (5.99)
Total 0.28 (0.29) −4.99 (0.71) −1.66 (0.44) 0.32 (1.15)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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when debt profi les increased faster than in any other period. In this sec-
tion, we review several possible explanations and weigh the evidence 
for each.
Formal Loans Crowding Out Informal Loans
The analysis above considers formal loans in which a promissory 
note has been signed and repayment shows up in credit reports. Informal 
loans from friends and family also occur, although it is unclear whether 
these are actually intended to be repaid (with or without interest). A pos-
sible “structural” explanation for debt increase is that formal loans have 
displaced informal loans over time. The NPSAS asked about informal 
loans only through 2000, but that covers the period in which observables 
have little explanatory power. Figure 4.8 plots CDFs of borrowing for 
1990, 1996, and 2000, both with and without informal borrowing. The 
thinner or paler lines refl ect the distributions of formal borrowing from 
Figure 4.1, while the thicker lines add in informal borrowing. If dis-
placement were occurring, we would see the difference between total 
and formal borrowing shrink over time. In fact, we see the opposite: 
while informal borrowing is rare in 1990, it expands by 1996 and is of a 
similar magnitude in 2000. We can thus rule out this story.
Parents Transferring Loan Burden to Children
Our analysis also has focused on debt in the student’s name and 
thus has excluded borrowing directly by parents in the form of PLUS 
Loans. While the terms of student-level loans are more generous than 
parent-level PLUS Loans (see Appendix 4B), parents are often in a bet-
ter fi nancial position with which to make repayment. However, if par-
ents have become less willing or able to borrow for their children than 
in the past, the transference of the burden could explain increases in 
student-level borrowing. Figure 4.9 shows that this is not the case. The 
lighter-line CDFs in the fi gure again show the distributions of borrow-
ing taken from Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines add in cumulative 
PLUS borrowing of parents (data for 1990 are unfortunately unavail-
able). Rather than decreasing over time, PLUS borrowing has increased 
substantially and become more pronounced further down the distribu-
tion. Thus, the intergenerational transfer explanation, at least through 
PLUS Loans, does not work, either.29
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Change in Interest Rates
The prevailing interest rates for student loans (federal and other) 
have varied over time, and basic economic theory implies that lower 
interest rates should increase borrowing, all other things being equal. 
Figure 4.10 presents time series for the interest rates on the predomi-
nant federal loan program, the Stafford Loan, as well as the U.S. prime 
rate, a benchmark for private loans and, at times, federal loans as well. 
Prior to the early 1990s, Congress periodically set a fi xed rate for Staf-
ford Loans (sometimes creating a huge subsidy, as in the early 1980s). 
Between 1992 and 2006, Stafford rates were tied to market rates before 
being fi xed again.30 Although interest rates drop by nearly four percent-
age points in the early 1990s, they are relatively fl at over the late 1990s, 
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines include student-level borrowing from all sources including loans from 
friends and family; thinner lines exclude these informal loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.8  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates with Informal Loans
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and they drop considerably again over the early 2000s recession. This 
pattern is not consistent with large increases in borrowing during the 
late 1990s and a fl at, or even falling, borrowing profi le between 2000 
and 2004. It would appear that the borrowing decisions of bachelor’s 
degree graduates are insensitive to the cost of loans, and interest rates 
therefore cannot explain the observed borrowing patterns.31
Borrowing Eligibility
Another set of possible factors deals with increased eligibility 
to borrow (on both extensive and intensive margins). As Appendix 
4B shows, major changes in the student loan market took place over 
the 1990s, including the introduction of unsubsidized Stafford Loans 
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines include borrowing from parental PLUS Loans; thinner lines exclude 
PLUS Loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.9  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates, with PLUS Loans
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(which are more available to higher-income families than are subsi-
dized Stafford Loans), increases in the federal statutory borrowing lim-
its, and the development of private loans. In contrast, there was little 
structural change in the loan market between 2000 and 2008 (although 
there was considerable change after the 2007–2008 school year). 
Except for a brief period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, fed-
eral loan eligibility was means tested and subject to a family-income 
threshold (with the government paying interest while the student was 
enrolled) until 1992. That year, unsubsidized loans fi rst became avail-
able. While interest accumulates on these loans from the time of dis-
bursement, students have access to them regardless of family income. 
Their availability opened up a large segment of the student popula-
tion to federal loans, so it would not be surprising if increases in the 
debt distribution followed. However, Figure 4.5 shows that borrowing 
increased much faster in the late 1990s than between 1990 and 1996 for 
NOTE: All federal loans were subsidized until 1992, when unsubsidized loans became 
available. 
SOURCE: Senate Committee on the Budget (2006); http://www.fi naid.org/loans/
historicalrates.phtml (accessed April 17, 2014).
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wealthier students—the group that would be expected to benefi t most 
from unsubsidized loan eligibility. Why didn’t their borrowing increase 
immediately after 1992? Three reasons suggest that unsubsidized loans 
became more important in the late 1990s despite becoming available 
for the 1992–1993 school year. First, total unsubsidized loan volume 
was quite small initially. In 1992–1993, unsubsidized loan disburse-
ments for all postsecondary students totaled $440 million (in 2011 dol-
lars), just 1.9 percent of aggregate loan volume. In 1993–1994, dis-
bursements had increased to $2.7 billion, an 8.9 percent share, and in 
1994–1995, the numbers jumped to $9.5 billion, a 26.7 percent share. 
From this point, the share increased slowly, to 32.5 percent by 1999–
2000 (College Board 2012a, Figure 6). Their impact thus would have 
been muted for the 1996 graduating cohort relative to the 2000 cohort. 
Second, the Survey of Consumer Finances (Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors 2012) shows a pronounced jump between 1995 and 1998 
(but not between 1992 and 1995) in both the median and mean values 
of educational loans among families, and these increases were con-
centrated among families whose heads were college educated, were in 
managerial or professional occupations, and had income in the second-
highest quintile. This pattern is consistent with increased loan volume 
for the types of households that would benefi t most from unsubsidized 
loans occurring several years after the program’s introduction. Third, 
and perhaps most tellingly, the income distribution among graduates 
with a Stafford Loan their senior year increased sharply (relative to the 
income distribution of all graduates) between 1996 and 2000, but not 
between 1993 and 1996.32 This is shown in Figure 4.11, with the lighter 
lines representing the income distributions for Stafford borrowers and 
the heavier lines those for all graduates.
Furthermore, it is possible to use a back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tion to quantify how important unsubsidized loans were to the increase 
in total borrowing between 1996 and 2000. Figure 4.12 shows the dif-
ference in senior-year borrowing between 1996 and 2000 by percentile 
(now on the x-axis). The solid line counts all borrowing, and the dashed 
line nets out unsubsidized Stafford Loans. Throughout much of the dis-
tribution, the gap between the two years is signifi cantly reduced once 
unsubsidized loans are taken out of the picture.33 Indeed, the mean gap 
in the latter case is only 36 percent of the former; the mean squared 
deviation, 66 percent. (Excluding the area above the 98th percentile, the 
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two fi gures are 24 and 23 percent, respectively.) In levels, the mean gap 
is reduced by $460, and if this pattern held for previous years of enroll-
ment, it could account for roughly $2,500, or about half, of the mean 
increase in total debt of $5,200 between 1996 and 2000.34 However, 
because of the factors mentioned above, this gap in senior-year borrow-
ing probably overstates the gap for earlier years, when unsubsidized 
loan volume was smaller. But the senior year alone can account for 9 
percent of the $5,200 difference, and even conservative estimates for 
previous class years would bring this share to a quarter.
Thus, unsubsidized loans were important for debt increases in the 
late 1990s, but what about increases in federal borrowing limits? The 
annual borrowing limit under the Stafford program, by far the largest 
federal loan program, was fi xed—in nominal terms—between July 
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent family income for the set of all graduates; thinner lines repre-
sent graduates who took out a Stafford Loan their senior year. 

























Figure 4.11  Cumulative Distribution Function of Family Income, All 
Graduates and Stafford Borrowers
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1993 and June 2007. The supplementary limits, which raise the maxi-
mum borrowing for independent students and some dependent students, 
were fi xed between July 1994 and June 2008. However, the increase in 
statutory limits in July 1993 applied only for students in their second 
or higher class year, and the shift in supplementary limits in July 1994 
applied only for students in their third or higher year. This means that 
graduates of the class of 1996 experienced the same nominal limits as 
the class of 2000; in real terms, borrowing limits declined slightly.35 
Consequently, borrowing limits are not behind the debt increase of the 
late 1990s.
The other major innovation of that time period was the rise of the 
private loan sector (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2012). Too 
new to be asked about explicitly in the 1996 NPSAS, private loans in 
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent all formal student-level borrowing in senior year; thinner lines 
exclude unsubsidized Stafford Loans. 
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Figure 4.12  Difference in Senior-Year Borrowing between 1996 and 
2000, with and without Unsubsidized Loans 
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that wave must be inferred by netting out institutional and state-level 
loans from all nonfederal loans. For graduates of that class, 1.0 percent 
took out a nonfederal loan their senior year, and most of these were 
institutional or state loans: just 0.3 percent took out an “other” or pri-
vate loan. By 2000, the numbers had increased to 6.2 and 4.6 percent, 
respectively, and they continued to grow through 2008 before retrench-
ing during the recession. The NPSAS data do not break out cumulative 
borrowing by nonfederal sector, but one can compare cumulative total 
borrowing to cumulative federal borrowing, and this is done in Figure 
4.13 for the 1996 and later waves. The lighter lines represent cumulative 
total borrowing, as in Figure 4.1, while the heavier lines show cumula-
tive federal borrowing only. The difference between the two captures 
nonfederal borrowing. For 1996, the gap occurs entirely below the 70th 
Figure 4.13  Cumulative Distribution Function of Borrowing among 
College Graduates, Federal Loans
NOTE: All calculations use sample weights and are in constant (year 2012) dollars. 
Thicker lines represent cumulative formal student-level borrowing from federal loans 
only; thinner lines include all loans, as in Figure 4.1. 
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percentile and is small, refl ecting that most of these nonfederal loans are 
institutional or state-based and intended for lower-income borrowers.36 
By 2000, the gap has widened, especially above the 75th percentile. In 
fact, about half of the total increase in borrowing in the top quartile is 
due to nonfederal—essentially private—loans. (For the same quartile 
between 1996 and 2008, about three-quarters of the increase is due to 
private loans, and between 2000 and 2008, all of it is, though much of 
this latter increase is accounted for by observables.37)
Broadly speaking, informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate 
changes, and statutory borrowing limits are unlikely to be factors behind 
the debt increase of the late 1990s. Unsubsidized Stafford Loans and 
private loans, on the other hand, are probable culprits, at least in part.
Other Explanations
One factor for which we have been unable to control is the use 
of tax credits, which came into existence in the late 1990s. Nicholas 
Turner (2012) has shown that the value of educational tax credits is 
largely capitalized into increases in net tuition (i.e., fewer institutional 
grants), with suggestive evidence that students compensate by borrow-
ing more. However, the timing of tax credit availability precludes them 
from being a major factor for the borrowing increases observed during 
the 1990s. Both the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits fi rst became 
available during the 1998–1999 school year (and tax deductions not 
until the 2002–2003 school year). As the Hope Credit was available 
only for the fi rst two years of postsecondary education, it could not have 
benefi tted students who graduated during the 1999–2000 school year 
and took four or more school years to fi nish. Until 2003, the Lifetime 
Learning program allowed a (nonrefundable) credit of 20 percent of the 
fi rst $5,000 in tuition and fees, making its maximum value $1,000.38 
But, according to the NPSAS data, only 20 percent of graduates’ fami-
lies claimed the credit in the 1999 tax year, and only about 20 percent of 
the claimants qualifi ed for the maximum credit. Even if the credit were 
completely capitalized into higher borrowing, it could explain only a 
tiny portion of the increase in debt in the late 1990s.39
Another factor we did not examine explicitly is the use of home 
equity loans and lines of credit for education fi nancing. There is some 
evidence that these tools became less important over the 1990s. In the 
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NPSAS, about 4 percent of the class of 1996 claimed to have used 
them, versus 2.3 percent in 2000. Similarly, the Survey of Consumer 
Finances shows that in 1989, 0.6 percent of all households were using 
a home equity loan or line of credit to pay for education expenses; by 
1995, the last year in which the purpose can be ascertained, the fi gure 
had fallen to 0.4 percent. These levels are probably too small to have 
had a meaningful impact on student borrowing. 
CONCLUSION
Using NPSAS data, we have shown that the entire debt profi le of 
college graduates grew much faster in the 1990s than in the 2000s, and 
that this growth was concentrated especially in the late 1990s. Between 
2000 and 2008, debt was remarkably stable for the bottom three quar-
ters of the distribution—the increase that took place in the top quar-
tile was driven by graduates at private, not-for-profi t institutions and 
stemmed largely from greater private borrowing. 
Statistical decomposition techniques consistently indicate that 
observable characteristics of students and institutions—such as demo-
graphics, geography, attendance patterns, income, and costs—explain 
about one-third of the overall debt increase across the two decades. 
However, their explanatory power is stronger at the extensive margin 
and in the middle of the distribution than in the right tail. Moreover, the 
observables account for more than half of the increase between 1990 
and 1996 and approximately all of it between 2000 and 2008, leav-
ing the late 1990s as the period that remains unexplained. Among the 
observables, cost tends to be the most important factor, often explaining 
about half of the observable share, but EFC is also important, as is the 
age structure in the 1990s and parental education in the 2000s.
In trying to unpack the puzzle of the late 1990s, we have ruled out 
informal loans, PLUS Loans, interest rate changes, and statutory bor-
rowing limits as likely explanations. Instead, the evidence is consistent 
with the “unobservable” share being driven by the advent of unsubsi-
dized Stafford Loans and private loans. This would imply that much of 
the debt increase over the 1990s—a much greater increase than over the 
2000s—was primarily due to supply-side and not demand-side factors. 
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Indeed, while nominal costs of college have risen considerably, so has 
fi nancial aid in the form of grants (Avery and Turner 2012; Greenstone 
and Looney 2013; see also Appendix Table 4C.1.) Our fi ndings show 
that changes in costs account for only 20 percent of the increase in 
distribution-wide borrowing between 1990 and 2008, and this is after 
capturing the complex interplay between nominal prices and grants. 
Of course, the partial-equilibrium analysis we have undertaken does 
not account for the possible endogeneity between college costs and 
fi nancial aid. Recent research on the incidence of federal fi nancial aid 
indicates that in many cases, schools seem to capture much of the benefi t: 
Nicholas Turner (2012) cannot rule out that schools offset one dollar of 
student tax benefi ts with one dollar of higher net tuition; Lesley Turner 
(2012) fi nds that schools on average reduce institutional grants by $0.16 
per dollar of Pell Grants ($0.80 for selective nonprofi ts); and Cellini and 
Goldin (2012) conclude that Title IV–eligible for-profi ts charge tuition 
78 percent higher than comparable programs in non-Title IV–eligible 
for-profi ts. Whether these results hold specifi cally for loans, however, is 
still an open question in which more research is needed. 
Notes
1. From January 1, 2012, through September 16, 2013, we found 504 hits of the 
search term “student debt” across the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the 
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, USA Today, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. 
News and World Report. For the same outlets, there were 673 hits between 1991 
and 2011, inclusive.
2. See Martin and Lehren (2012) and Mitchell and Jackson-Randall (2012). 
3. For example, collegerealitycheck.com and collegecompletion.chronicle.com (both 
by the Chronicle for Higher Education); collegecost.ed.gov/scorecard/ and college
cost.ed.gov/catc/ (both by the federal government); projectonstudentdebt.org (by 
The Institute for College Access and Success); and collegeportraits.org (by the 
American Association of State Colleges and Universities).
4. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi ce/2013/08/22/remarks-president
-college-affordability-buffalo-ny (accessed April 17, 2014). Congress has also 
investigated growing debt (Joint Economic Committee 2013).
5. We hope to investigate other groups in subsequent work.
6. The 2012 wave of NPSAS was released in late August of 2013. Although we have 
requested these data, our analyses are currently limited to 2008 as an endpoint.
7. It also forms the sampling frame for two longitudinal surveys: the Beginning Post-
secondary Students study (BPS), which tracks fi rst-time students, and the Bac-
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calaureate and Beyond study (B&B), which tracks bachelor recipients. We use the 
NPSAS rather than the B&B because the former is available earlier and more often.
8. The NPSAS was also fi elded in 1993. However, an error in the survey led to many 
bachelor’s degree graduates not being asked the relevant questions on cumulative 
borrowing, forcing us to exclude this wave.
9. Unfortunately, private, for-profi t institutions are too small a group to examine in 
all but the 2008 wave. Even then, fewer than 4 percent of bachelor’s recipients 
graduated from a private, for-profi t institution. Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner 
(2010) document rising time to bachelor’s degree and attempt to explain the fac-
tors behind it.
10. Improper specifi cation of the model, such as omitted variables, would show up in 
this component.
11. For example, in gender-wage discrimination, the reference coeffi cient is often set 
to that of men because the exercise is meant to examine how much of the gender 
gap can be attributable to differences in characteristics under the assumption that 
the return to those characteristics is the same as men’s (the “explained” part) and 
how much is attributable to “discrimination” (the “unexplained” part, but see Note 
10).
12. It is also more robust to functional form violations, such as when Y is a nonlinear 
function of X. Because this functional form need not be known, the technique is 
semiparametric. On the other hand, it is more sensitive to the common support 
requirement that sets of covariate realizations are common to both groups.
13. This setup will make the distribution of XB resemble the distribution of XA; switch-
ing the coding of the dependent variable will cause the reverse.
14. This follows because fraction q of the population (and sample analogue) has Y ≤ Yq, 
by defi nition of q.
15. We also experimented with using time to degree, which was available in every 
wave except 1990. Somewhat surprisingly, the inclusion of this variable, condi-
tional on the others, had a negligible effect on the decompositions. In order to 
include the 1990 wave, we thus chose to exclude time to degree in the presented 
results.
16. Expected family contribution measures a student’s family’s ability to pay for col-
lege expenses and is based on family structure, income, and certain assets (exclud-
ing home equity). The relationship between borrowing and EFC is likely non-
monotonic, as low EFC levels increase the likelihood of receiving grant aid, and 
very high EFC levels are associated with a lower need to borrow. The cost of atten-
dance is broader than tuition and fees and also includes room and board, books, 
travel, and other expenses.
17. A polynomial in net cost implies parameter restrictions in the more fl exible model. 
When we test these restrictions in the relationship between borrowing and cost 
and aid structure, they are sharply rejected at all conventional signifi cance levels.
18. When the constituent variables diverge in their effects, we make note of it.
19. There is also a slightly positive role from demographics (an increasing minority 
share) and an offsetting role from location (regional changes in graduates from the 
Northeast to the South).
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20. Indeed, as Appendix 4B documents, unsubsidized Stafford Loans, which are not 
means tested, became available in 1992, and this would be expected to increase 
borrowing at the extensive margin.
21. Note that while the Oaxaca-Blinder results showed a small role for observables 
at the extensive margin during this time period, the estimate was not statistically 
different from zero.
22. Standard errors are calculated by bootstrapping the entire RIF procedure (with 100 
replications) to account for estimation error in the density function.
23. The attendance coeffi cient is largely driven by a shift from nondoctoral to doctoral 
public institutions (see Appendix Table 4C.2). 
24. For evidence of the growing role of amenities in driving students’ attendance deci-
sions, see Jacob, McCall, and Stange (2013).
25. Recall that the cost structure observables include quartics in list prices and grants 
and their pairwise interactions. These relationships are highly nonlinear and non-
monotonic, so it is not quite accurate to say that “costs” rose; we are trading off 
accuracy for expediency.
26. That borrowing increased less than predicted at this quantile is due to a change 
in the coeffi cients on marital status; specifi cally, married graduates borrowed less 
than single graduates in 1990, but this relationship reversed in 1996. Since singles 
increased as a share of graduates between 1990 and 1996 (Table 4C.2), borrowing 
was predicted to have increased.
27. The explanatory shares of the cost structure are slightly lower when using cost of 
attendance rather than tuition, refl ecting a reduction in nontuition expenses that 
partially offset tuition hikes over this period (see Appendix Table 4C.1).
28. The difference between the decomposition techniques over this time period may 
stem from the functional form limitation of the RIF (i.e., linearity). However, iso-
lating the role of specifi c observables through sequential reweighting yields simi-
lar relative magnitudes as RIF.
29. We unfortunately cannot observe direct transfers from parents to students. How-
ever, since parents are borrowing more through PLUS Loans, it is very unlikely 
that the transfer motive has decreased.
30. In late summer of 2013, new legislation passed that will again tie federal borrow-
ing rates to market rates. Although, prior to the legislation’s passage, much atten-
tion was given to the fact that subsidized rates would double to the unsubsidized 
rate for the 2013–2014 school year, it was generally unmentioned that the rates had 
differed at all only since 2009. Note also that, historically, Stafford rates were sim-
ilar to or below the U.S. prime rate except during and after the Great Recession.
31. There is surprisingly little work on the elasticity of credit demand with respect 
to price in the higher education context, and it would be a fruitful area for future 
research.
32. We use the 1993 wave here because the data are for senior-year and not cumula-
tive borrowing. While NPSAS separates survey school year Stafford borrowing by 
subsidized and unsubsidized status beginning in 1996, it unfortunately does not do 
so for cumulative borrowing.
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33. The notable exception is above the 95th percentile and is probably due to private 
loans, which are discussed next. The negative section of the lines refl ects the nomi-
nal annual borrowing cap for Stafford Loans.
34. This assumes a time to degree of 5.5 years, the average for the class of 2000 in the 
NPSAS data.
35. These statements also apply to lifetime borrowing limits.
36. In 1996, the median recipient of institutional or state loans was below the 30th 
percentile of the family income distribution of all students; the median recipient of 
a private loan was at the 70th percentile.
37. That observables can account for most of the change between 2000 and 2008 is 
likely in large part due to private loans being well established by 2000. An auxil-
iary analysis that examined the period between 1996 and 2008, with 1996 refer-
ence coeffi cients, found a much smaller role for observables.
38. The threshold was raised from $5,000 to $10,000 in 2003. In all years, the credit 
was subject to income phase-outs. 
39. A back-of-the-envelope calculation that subtracts the real value of the credit from 
cumulative borrowing—among all students, not just those claiming the credit—
shows that debt would have risen by about $500 less at most points of the distribu-
tion between 1996 and 2000. At the mean, this is less than 10 percent. At the 90th 
percentile, it is about 5 percent.
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Appendix 4A
NPSAS Data Details
The National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) has been fi elded 
eight times: in 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. In each 
case, the year references the spring semester or the end of the school year. 
This chapter employs the restricted-use 1990, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 
waves.1 The 1987 wave was not used because its sampling frame and question 
bank were signifi cantly different from those of subsequent waves. The 1993 
wave was not used because of an interviewing error that caused the cumulative 
borrowing question—the key outcome of interest—to be not asked of some 
graduates. Finally, the 2012 wave has only been partially released. (We plan to 
update the study when the 2012 wave is fully released.)
The longitudinal comparisons in the chapter required that the data be har-
monized across waves. Although each wave is similar to the preceding one, 
there have been many variable name changes and some defi nition (or universe) 
changes over time. In most cases, it was straightforward to rename variables 
or recode values for consistency, although this often necessitated losing some 
detail for categorical responses. The processing of the most important vari-
ables for the analysis is described in this section.2
The primary outcome variable is the cumulative borrowing of the student 
from all sources for undergraduate education. The variable is called BORAMT1 
in each of the waves we use, although its construction varies somewhat over 
time. In 2004 and 2008, BORAMT1 is constructed as the greater of the stu-
dent’s self-reported borrowing total, the cumulative federal borrowing total 
taken from the National Student Loan Data System plus self-reported private 
borrowing in the survey school year, or self-reported total borrowing in the 
survey school year. In each case, the borrowing numbers exclude loans in the 
name of parents or guardians (e.g., PLUS Loans), as well as informal loans 
without a promissory note. This is the defi nition of cumulative borrowing we 
use in the paper.
In 2000, there are two versions of the BORAMT1 variable: one that 
matches the 2004 and 2008 defi nition, and one that also includes informal 
loans. We use the fi rst version. In 1996, only the version that includes informal 
borrowing is available. However, a separate variable (FAMLOAN) asks about 
cumulative loans from friends and family, although this variable is present 
only for the portion of the sample that conducted a CATI interview (about two-
thirds of the overall sample). We revise the BORAMT1 variable in 1996 by 
subtracting from it FAMLOAN among the CATI part of the sample and use a 
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revised sampling weight (see below) to correct for the smaller sample. In 1990, 
historical data from National Student Loan Data System was not included. 
All cumulative borrowing is thus self-reported. After applying the maximizer 
decision rule used in the 2004 and 2008 waves, PARLOAN is subtracted from 
BORAMT1, where PARLOAN represents informal borrowing for the 1989–
1990 school year. (There is no cumulative informal loan variable in the 1990 
NPSAS, so cumulative loan totals, especially near the top of the distribution, 
may be biased upward.) 
The cleaned BORAMT1 variable is converted to year 2012 dollars using 
the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) defl ator from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. We then applied the following fi ve sample restrictions to 
focus on our population of interest (the 2008 nomenclature of the variable[s] 
used for the restriction is in parentheses):
1. The respondent was enrolled in the fall term of the survey school 
year at an institution in the 50 U.S. states or the District of Columbia 
(COMPTO87 = 1).
2. The respondent was enrolled at a primarily bachelor’s (or higher) 
degree-granting institution (SECTOR9 = 3,4,6,7,9).
3. The respondent was an undergraduate during the survey school year 
(STUDTYP = 1).
4. The respondent earned a bachelor’s degree during the survey school 
year (COLLGRAD = 1).
5. The respondent was not a foreign or international student on an edu-
cation visa (SAMESTAT ≤ 2).
Additionally, because construction of a consistent, cumulative borrowing 
amount in the 1996 wave required variables from the interview component of 
the survey, the estimation sample for that wave was restricted to respondents 
with a positive interview weight (CATIWT > 0). The WTA000 sample weights 
were used for the 2000 and later waves (using late 2013 vintage weights), the 
WTB000 sample weight was used for the 1996 wave, and the PSKEEPWT 
sample weight was used for the 1990 wave.
The NPSAS is also used as the sampling frame for two longitudinal 
studies, the Beginning Postsecondary Study (BPS), which follows fi rst-time 
postsecondary students, and the Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B), which fol-
lows bachelor’s degree recipients. These two studies alternate NPSAS waves, 
with BPS being drawn from the 1990, 1996, 2004, and 2012 NPSAS waves, 
and B&B being drawn from the 1993, 2000, and 2008 NPSAS waves. Since 
the population of interest for the longitudinal studies is oversampled in the 
NPSAS, the effective sample sizes for college graduates is quite large in 2000 
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and 2008 and somewhat smaller in 1990, 1996, and 2004. Final sample sizes, 
rounded to the nearest 10 to comply with rules on disclosure, are found in 
Appendix Table 4C.5.
The NPSAS is not the only data set that can be used to track how stu-
dent debt profi les have changed over the last 20 years. Some longitudinal data 
sets, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics, ask about educational borrowing, as does the repeated, 
cross-sectional Survey of Consumer Finances. These latter data sets have 
the advantages of containing information on other forms of debt as well as 
income and loan repayment information. However, they have a few disadvan-
tages relative to the NPSAS. First, the sample sizes are much smaller. While 
the NPSAS typically has several thousand college graduates in each wave (or 
cohort), the other data sets often have only a few hundred per cohort, and this 
makes examining entire distributions more diffi cult. Second, the data on col-
lege expenses and fi nancing are not as detailed. The NPSAS benefi ts from the 
merge with administrative data on exact loan amounts and family fi nancials, 
and it surveys students immediately after the school year. The other data sets 
often gather loan data from retrospective questions, introducing the possibility 
of recall bias.
While we believe NPSAS is the best data set to look at cumulative bor-
rowing at graduation, the other data sets have a comparative advantage when 
investigating the topics of loan repayment, default, and debt-income ratios, 
and how and why these have changed over time. These are clearly important 
topics, but they are beyond the scope of the current chapter.
Appendix Notes
1. These are available by license from the Department of Education’s Institute of 
Education Sciences (IES) after an application process.
2. A complete list of variables used is available by request from the authors.
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Appendix 4B
A Primer on Student Loans
FEDERAL LOANS
The primary federal borrowing program for undergraduates is the Stafford 
program, established in 1965 as part of the Higher Education Act that year, 
and later named after Senator Robert Stafford in 1988.1 Originally intended 
for lower-income students, all Stafford Loans were subsidized until 1992, with 
the federal government paying the interest while the student was enrolled.2 
Beginning that year, unsubsidized Stafford Loans became available for stu-
dents regardless of their fi nancial background. These loans accumulate interest 
while the student is enrolled, although repayment for either type of Stafford 
Loan does not begin until six months after school leaving.
Stafford Loans account for the vast majority of federal lending to stu-
dents. Among graduating seniors in the 2007–2008 school year, for example, 
Stafford Loans accounted for 96 percent of federal borrowing, with about 60 
percent of this volume as subsidized loans.3 While these loans require the stu-
dent to fi ll out the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form, 
they are not subject to credit checks and do not require a cosigner. There are 
limits, however, to how much can be borrowed each year and over a student’s 
lifetime, and these limits have changed over time.
The other major undergraduate federal student lending program is the 
PLUS Loan, which consists of loans to the students’ parents (or legal guard-
ians) rather than directly to the student herself. These also require the FAFSA 
form to be fi led. Unlike the Stafford Loan, PLUS Loans are subject to a credit 
check.
Both the Stafford and PLUS Loans were administered under the Federal 
Family Educational Loan Program (FFELP) as well as the Direct program. 
Under FFELP, private lenders made loans to students under the terms set by 
the federal government and received subsidies to cover interest rate spread 
and nonpayment. Under the Direct program, the federal government acted as 
the lender. The FFELP ended in 2010, with all new loans operating under the 
Direct program. From the point of view of the borrower, there is practically no 
difference between the two programs, as terms and conditions are identical.
Table 4B.1 shows the annual limits (in nominal dollars) for the Stafford 
program. Starting in July 2008, these limits were increased by $2,000 for each 
class year for dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS 
Loan), but this higher limit was available only as an unsubsidized loan. 
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For independent students and dependent students whose parents were 
denied a PLUS Loan, the limits in Table 4B.1 were increased by the amounts 
shown in Table 4B.2, with these higher limits also available only as unsubsi-
dized loans.
In addition to these annual loan limits, there are also cumulative lifetime 
limits on Stafford borrowing. Through 1986, this aggregate limit was $12,500. 
In 1987, the limit was raised to $17,500, and in October of 1992, it was raised 
again to $23,000. For subsidized loans, this (nominal) cap is still in place. For 
dependent students (whose parents were not denied a PLUS Loan), the lifetime 
Stafford limit was increased to $31,000 in July 2008, but amounts beyond 
$23,000 must be unsubsidized loans. For independent students (or dependent 
students whose parents were denied a PLUS Loan), the limit was increased 
to $46,000 in July 1994 and to $57,500 in July 2008, but again the balance 
beyond $23,000 must be unsubsidized loans.
The PLUS Loan for parents was initially capped at $4,000 per year (and 
$20,000 per student lifetime), but this changed in 1993, with the annual limit 
set to the net cost of attendance (list price minus grants) and an unlimited life-
time amount.
PRIVATE LOANS
Private educational lending (not to be confused with FFELP loans, above) 
was practically nonexistent until the late 1990s, when attendance costs grew 
enough relative to the federal borrowing limits to create a market for addi-
tional lending. Private loans do not require a FAFSA but often do require credit 
checks and/or a cosigner. Their interest rates and fee structures are generally 
more variable than federal loans, with terms that are often worse except for 
the most creditworthy students. While there are no statutory borrowing lim-
its, borrowing is functionally limited by the net cost of attendance as well as 
creditworthiness.
Among graduating seniors in 2008, 20 percent took out a private loan that 
year; these loans constituted 34 percent of total borrowing. (These numbers 
were up from 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in 2000.) Private loan 
volume decreased dramatically after 2008 in the wake of the Great Recession 
as private capital dried up, but it is expected to grow again as the economy 
improves, as long as education costs continue to grow faster than federal bor-
rowing limits.
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OTHER LOANS
In addition to the federal and private lending programs, some states and 
educational institutions themselves have lending programs. These programs, 
however, are very small relative to federal and private loans. Less than 2 per-
cent of graduating seniors in 2008 received loans from states or educational 
institutions, and these loans made up less than 2 percent of the total loan vol-
ume for the same set of students.
Finally, there are informal loans in which students borrow directly from 
their parents or other relatives and friends. Because these loans do not appear 
on credit reports, and because it is uncertain whether they are expected to be 
repaid, NPSAS stopped collecting data on them after 2000.
Appendix Notes
1. Much of the material in this appendix, including the timeline of changes and statu-
tory borrowing limits, is drawn from www.fi naid.org and Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2013).
2. Except for a brief period between 1978 and 1982, eligibility for subsidized loans 
has been means tested throughout the life of the program.
Table 4B.1  Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by Calendar 
Year and Class Standing
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year +
1977–1986 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500
1987–June 1993 2,625 2,625 4,000 4,000
July 1993–June 2007 2,625 3,500 5,500 5,500
July 2007–June 2012 3,500 4,500 5,500 5,500
Table 4B.2  Supplemental Undergraduate Stafford Borrowing Limits, by 
Calendar Year and Class Standing
1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year +
1986–1994 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000
July 1994–June 2008 4,000 4,000 5,000 5,000
July 2008– June 2012 6,000 6,000 7,000 7,000
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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3. Almost all of the remaining 4 percent consists of Perkins Loans, which are intended 
for very low-income students and function similarly to subsidized Stafford Loans 
with slightly more generous terms. About 6 percent of graduating seniors in 2008 
received Perkins Loans, while 51 percent received Stafford Loans.
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Appendix 4C
Supplemental Tables
Table 4C.1  Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS 
(continuous variables), by Wave (000s of 2012 $)
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NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with 
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Monetary amounts (in $000) are infl ated to 
2012 using the PCE index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Family income is 
for the calendar year two years prior to graduation year; tuition (and required fees) 
is for the fi nal year of enrollment for students who attended only one institution that 
year and is adjusted for attendance intensity. Cost of attendance is tuition plus room 
and board, books, travel, and other expenses (also adjusted for attendance intensity 
by NPSAS).
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
Table 4C.1  (continued)
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Table 4C.2  Summary Statistics of BA/BS Graduates from NPSAS 
(Categorical Variables), by Wave
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008
Dependency status
Dependent 59.0 58.7 58.2 59.1 62.0
Independent 41.0 41.3 41.8 40.9 38.0
Age
Less than 21 3.9 1.5 2.0 6.1 6.9
21 26.2 26.0 25.0 22.5 23.8
22 26.1 22.9 24.0 23.5 23.6
23 12.1 13.4 12.6 12.4 12.8
24 6.1 6.8 6.3 6.3 6.3
25–29 10.3 16.0 13.5 12.7 12.4
30–34 5.5 4.3 5.7 5.7 4.9
Older than 34 9.9 9.2 10.8 10.9 9.3
Sex
Male 45.3 43.5 42.5 42.1 42.7




79.6 84.6 82.2 81.2 84.6
Married 19.7 15.1 16.9 17.5 14.4
Separated 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.3 1.0
Race/ethnicity
White, non-Hispanic 86.2 82.7 75.6 73.6 70.5
Black, non-Hispanic 5.7 6.0 8.2 9.2 10.0
Hispanic 4.0 4.5 6.8 7.7 9.4
Asian 3.6 5.9 6.2 6.2 7.2
Native American/other 0.4 1.0 3.3 3.2 2.9
Mother’s education
Unknown 7.1 10.3 9.2 2.5 2.7
Less than high school 7.4 5.0 6.8 6.8 6.1
High school/GED 39.2 36.1 31.0 32.1 28.1
Some college 19.6 18.2 19.1 23.5 26.2
Bachelor’s 17.3 19.6 22.7 21.9 22.4
Postgraduate 9.4 10.9 11.3 13.2 14.5
(continued)
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1990 1996 2000 2004 2008
Father’s education
Unknown 9.0 11.4 10.2 4.4 5.0
Less than high school 8.3 6.0 8.0 8.3 7.0
High school/GED 25.2 27.7 25.2 27.7 27.1
Some college 14.7 10.3 14.7 18.8 20.3
Bachelor’s 19.8 22.3 23.4 21.9 21.4
Postgraduate 19.4 20.5 18.5 18.9 19.3
Attendance pattern
Full-time, full-year, 1 
school
45.1 55.5 52.4 52.7 54.8
Full-time, full-year, 2+ 
school
1.3 1.5 2.5 3.3 4.5
Full-time, part-year 16.0 11.9 18.0 13.5 13.1
Part-time, full-year, 1 
school
17.3 19.8 15.6 17.9 14.3
Part-time, full-year, 2+ 
schools 
7.0 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.9
Part-time, part-year 13.3 9.8 10.7 11.3 11.4
Years to degree
Unknown – 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
Fewer than 4 – 1.6 12.6 10.8 8.9
4 – 32.6 34.5 34.5 35.7
5 – 24.4 21.3 22.6 21.0
6 – 11.6 8.0 8.1 9.1
7–9 – 12.6 9.2 9.3 10.9
10 or more – 16.7 14.0 14.7 14.4
Institution sector
Public, nondoctoral 29.6 20.1 19.6 21.6 16.8
Public, doctoral 36.4 44.8 46.3 45.8 49.0
Private, NFP,a nondoc 19.5 21.9 19.7 17.9 15.0
Private, NFP, doc 13.8 12.6 13.2 12.4 15.0
Private, FPb 0.6 0.6 1.3 2.3 4.2
Institution region
New England 10.8 4.7 6.5 8.2 5.8
Mid East 19.5 19.8 17.9 14.8 17.4
Great Lakes 18.9 18.1 16.6 14.4 14.7
Table 4C.2  (continued)
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1990 1996 2000 2004 2008
Plains 6.7 7.5 8.6 8.3 7.9
Southeast 18.3 22.4 22.7 26.2 25.4
Southwest 8.2 10.9 10.5 8.5 11.5
Rocky Mts. 3.8 2.9 3.7 6.6 4.0
Far West 13.8 13.8 13.5 13.2 13.5
In-state student
Yes, public 60.1 58.5 58.1 61.5 60.7
Yes, private 22.0 22.5 21.8 22.2 22.2
No 17.9 19.1 20.1 16.3 17.0
Major
Unknown 6.7 2.3 2.5 1.5 0.8
Humanities 13.9 12.6 13.2 12.5 13.6
Social sciences 14.6 17.3 16.8 15.5 14.7
Life sciences 4.8 10.0 7.2 6.6 9.5
Physical sciences/math 1.8 3.7 2.4 2.6 2.4
Computer science 2.3 2.5 4.4 5.3 2.4
Engineering 7.1 6.1 4.8 5.3 6.3
Education 7.8 8.8 9.2 10.3 8.1
Business 22.5 19.5 20.1 20.5 21.0
Health 8.9 9.4 9.0 6.9 7.8
Other 9.7 8.0 10.4 13.0 13.5
a Not for profi t.
b For profi t.
NOTE: Statistics use population weights and are for domestic students graduating with 
a bachelor’s degree in the year indicated. Attendance pattern refers to the fi nal year of 
enrollment. Years to degree refers to the difference between the calendar year of fi rst 
postsecondary enrollment and the graduation year indicated. In-state students attend 
an institution in their state of legal residence.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
Table 4C.2  (continued)
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Table 4C.3A  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Tuition
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.01 (0.49) 0.58 (0.47) 6.35 (0.97) 4.55 (0.92)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.13) 0.66 (0.20) 0.92 (0.27) 0.43 (0.24)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.12 (0.06) −0.02 (0.09) −0.06 (0.11) −0.11 (0.12)
Parental education −0.07 (0.07) 0.16 (0.13) 0.16 (0.16) 0.13 (0.17)
Location, in-state status −0.24 (0.20) −0.55 (0.32) −0.40 (0.40) −0.24 (0.49)
School sector, attendance, major −0.11 (0.23) 0.54 (0.64) −0.23 (0.47) −0.14 (0.55)
Expected family contribution 0.25 (0.09) 0.72 (0.17) 0.88 (0.21) 0.98 (0.22)
Tuition and grants 1.14 (0.33) 0.72 (0.52) 1.65 (0.51) 0.44 (0.84)
Total 1.22 (0.40) 2.23 (0.57) 2.92 (0.75) 1.49 (1.06)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 0.52 (0.67) 1.99 (0.55) 1.63 (1.36) −3.12 (1.30)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −1.90 (2.75) −3.44 (1.72) −2.44 (5.09) −3.83 (4.11)
Parental education 0.29 (0.55) −0.23 (0.49) 0.18 (1.01) 1.60 (1.07)
Location, in-state status 0.68 (0.81) 0.32 (0.59) −0.21 (1.39) −0.05 (1.55)
School sector, attendance, major 1.88 (1.86) −0.57 (4.95) 5.60 (3.44) 3.36 (3.44)
Expected family contribution −3.72 (0.85) −1.23 (0.72) −5.22 (1.62) −1.13 (1.41)
Tuition and grants 2.92 (2.07) −1.76 (2.20) 7.31 (4.27) 9.98 (4.07)
Constant 0.14 (3.78) 3.25 (6.14) −3.42 (7.98) −3.76 (6.69)
Total 0.79 (0.50) −1.65 (0.55) 3.43 (0.95) 3.06 (1.33)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.3B  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1990–1996, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 2.01 (0.49) 0.58 (0.47) 6.35 (0.97) 4.55 (0.92)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.13 (0.11) 0.63 (0.19) 0.76 (0.24) 0.25 (0.23)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.18 (0.07) −0.02 (0.09) −0.07 (0.12) −0.13 (0.14)
Parental education −0.06 (0.07) 0.17 (0.14) 0.15 (0.17) 0.14 (0.18)
Location, in-state status −0.26 (0.20) −0.54 (0.31) −0.50 (0.41) −0.32 (0.50)
School sector, attendance, major 0.09 (0.19) 0.12 (0.28) −0.15 (0.45) 0.12 (0.57)
Expected family contribution 0.27 (0.10) 0.71 (0.18) 0.89 (0.21) 0.95 (0.22)
Attendance cost and grants 0.40 (0.19) 0.94 (0.28) 0.80 (0.41) 0.19 (0.42)
Total 0.73 (0.38) 2.00 (0.52) 1.88 (0.74) 1.19 (0.80)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status 0.65 (0.67) 1.89 (0.55) 1.73 (1.34) −3.21 (1.32)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity −3.02 (2.97) −4.04 (1.72) −4.43 (5.37) −5.87 (4.50)
Parental education 0.39 (0.56) −0.17 (0.48) 0.42 (1.02) 1.69 (1.09)
Location, in-state status 0.68 (0.84) 0.19 (0.60) −0.40 (1.39) −0.25 (1.57)
School sector, attendance, major 0.02 (1.69) 1.54 (1.56) 1.36 (3.46) −1.73 (3.46)
Expected family contribution −3.75 (0.85) −1.58 (0.71) −6.15 (1.59) −2.22 (1.43)
Attendance cost and grants 0.72 (2.77) −9.79 (3.30) 2.93 (6.41) 5.66 (5.47)
Constant 5.60 (4.27) 10.54 (4.09) 9.00 (9.07) 9.30 (7.89)
Total 1.28 (0.49) −1.43 (0.50) 4.47 (0.96) 3.36 (1.11)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.4A  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Tuition
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 5.12 (0.46) 8.45 (0.60) 6.78 (0.83) 9.41 (0.86)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.04 (0.12) 0.01 (0.04) −0.05 (0.15) −0.12 (0.31)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.13 (0.14) 0.07 (0.06) 0.05 (0.21) 0.01 (0.15)
Parental education −0.04 (0.15) −0.06 (0.09) 0.08 (0.33) −0.10 (0.29)
Location, in-state status 0.11 (0.17) −0.08 (0.15) 0.31 (0.46) 0.03 (0.39)
School sector, attendance, major 0.37 (0.16) 0.35 (0.17) 0.07 (0.53) 0.70 (0.52)
Expected family contribution −0.32 (0.18) −0.43 (0.11) −1.12 (0.31) −0.68 (0.20)
Tuition and grants −0.12 (0.32) −0.52 (0.25) −0.83 (0.86) −0.54 (0.85)
Total 0.18 (0.51) −0.67 (0.33) −1.50 (1.12) −0.70 (1.02)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −1.06 (0.63) −2.65 (0.67) −1.58 (1.23) −3.59 (1.21)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.05 (2.69) 1.21 (1.61) 1.38 (4.68) −0.57 (4.29)
Parental education −0.02 (0.47) 1.55 (0.49) −0.92 (0.75) −1.37 (0.83)
Location, in-state status −0.39 (0.68) 0.71 (0.82) 0.18 (1.33) −1.33 (1.43)
School sector, attendance, major −0.78 (1.46) −4.91 (1.44) −3.65 (2.75) −2.64 (2.69)
Expected family contribution 2.12 (0.88) −5.55 (0.88) 5.85 (1.62) 1.13 (1.42)
Tuition and grants −0.31 (1.96) 8.59 (2.09) −8.68 (3.98) −2.51 (3.61)
Constant 5.33 (3.58) 10.17 (3.05) 15.69 (7.18) 20.99 (6.40)
Total 4.94 (0.48) 9.13 (0.62) 8.28 (1.13) 10.10 (1.11)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
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Table 4C.4B  Recentered Infl uence Function Decompositions of Borrowing: 1996–2000, Using Cost of Attendance 
Mean 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
Difference (000s of 2012 $) 5.12 (0.46) 8.45 (0.60) 6.78 (0.83) 9.41 (0.86)
Composition effects due to: 
Age/dependency status 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.13) −0.07 (0.28)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.15 (0.14) 0.08 (0.06) 0.10 (0.20) 0.03 (0.15)
Parental education −0.07 (0.15) −0.08 (0.09) −0.03 (0.34) −0.16 (0.29)
Location, in-state status 0.13 (0.18) −0.13 (0.16) 0.11 (0.46) −0.15 (0.40)
School sector, attendance, major 0.39 (0.15) 0.42 (0.16) 0.39 (0.50) 0.78 (0.51)
Expected family contribution −0.31 (0.18) −0.45 (0.12) −1.19 (0.33) −0.73 (0.21)
Attendance cost and grants 0.21 (0.35) −0.37 (0.25) −0.61 (0.87) −0.30 (0.82)
Total 0.51 (0.53) −0.52 (0.35) −1.22 (1.13) −0.59 (1.04)
Structural effects due to:
Age/dependency status −1.09 (0.63) −2.23 (0.65) −1.97 (1.18) −3.40 (1.20)
Sex, marital status, ethnicity 0.57 (2.88) 1.55 (1.59) 2.11 (4.97) 0.16 (4.56)
Parental education −0.15 (0.48) 1.39 (0.49) −1.18 (0.76) −1.56 (0.83)
Location, in-state status −0.32 (0.70) 0.87 (0.83) 0.61 (1.32) −0.92 (1.46)
School sector, attendance, major −0.80 (1.48) −6.45 (1.37) −2.76 (2.94) −2.31 (2.60)
Expected family contribution 1.61 (0.86) −5.99 (0.86) 6.10 (1.59) 0.63 (1.45)
Attendance cost and grants 2.58 (2.91) 21.80 (4.11) −2.13 (5.85) 5.49 (5.57)
Constant 2.21 (4.28) −1.98 (4.47) 7.20 (8.24) 11.91 (7.62)
Total 4.61 (0.49) 8.97 (0.63) 8.00 (1.12) 10.00 (1.12)
NOTE: Each column refers to the later period less the earlier period. The recentered infl uence functions and quantiles are calculated with 
sample weights; the decompositions are based on coeffi cients from the base period reference and are estimated via OLS (without sample 
weights). Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) are in parentheses. Borrowing is from all sources except friends and family and 
excludes loans taken out by parents (PLUS Loans).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from selected years of NPSAS.
up15bhslatch4.indd   113
up15bhslatch4.indd   113
2/17/2015   9:24:55 A
M
2/17/2015   9:24:55 A
M
114   Hershbein and Hollenbeck
Table 4C.5  Sample Sizes
1990 1996 2000 2004 2008
College graduates 3,270 1,340 12,230 5,170 23,340
Weighted: college 
graduates
724,000 897,000 1,217,000 1,448,000 1,822,000
NOTE: College graduates are oversampled in 2000 and 2008, as these years represent 
sampling frames for the Baccalaureate and Beyond longitudinal studies. Sample sizes 
are rounded to the nearest 10 (thousand for weighted numbers) to comply with dis-
closure restrictions.
SOURCE: NPSAS, selected years.
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